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ABSTRACT 
 
In October 2005, during construction works at the new Lippe canal bridge, massive water leakage from the Dortmund-Ems-Canal 
occurred below a wing wall at the northern abutment of the old, still operated canal bridge. Water passed through a leak of the clay-
lined canal, flowing underneath a pile-supported wing wall into a minor excavation pit. This excavation pit was supposed to be 
protected by a surcharge filter. Since failure of the lining should be considered for all construction phases, it cannot be regarded as the 
cause of the disaster. Consequently, the paper focuses on the verification against hydraulic heave and erosion for the excavation pit. It 
is demonstrated that Terzaghi’s statements on this topic remain valid and should not fall into oblivion.  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Lippe canal bridge is a navigable aqueduct carrying the 
Dortmund-Ems-Canal (DEK) over the River Lippe. It was 
planned to replace the old Lippe canal bridge by a new set of 
parallel twin span bridges, each serving north- or southbound 
ship traffic. On October 11th 2005, during construction works 
at the new Lippe Canal Bridge, massive water leakage from 
the DEK occurred below a wing wall at the northern abutment 
of the old, still fully operational canal bridge. By closing the 
safety gates Datteln and Schlieker, the canal stretch that was 
emptied could be limited to 8 km (cf. Fig. 1). As the water 
could flow freely into the Lippe and as the involved engineers 
acted with care, personal injuries were avoided. However, the 
damage removal alone cost more than $ 20 million and the 
canal had to be closed for several weeks. In the following, the 
project and the accident are described briefly. Moreover, this 
paper presents some conclusions made from the investigation 
on the verification against hydraulic heave and erosion for the 
excavation pit, which was performed by BAW after the 
accident. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Site plan 
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Fig. 2: Aerial photograph of the construction works (August 18th, 2005) 
 
2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
 
The DEK is being expanded to meet the requirements of larger 
motor cargo vessels. This measure requires the renewal of the 
canal bridges spanning the Ems and Lippe Rivers. 
Construction works at the Lippe canal bridge started in spring 
2004. The construction of the Ems canal bridge is planned to 
start soon. The aerial photograph of the Lippe canal bridge 
(Fig. 2) shows that the construction area is situated in an 
above-ground canal stretch of the DEK. The embankment 
crest is at approx. 15 m above the natural terrain. The regular 
water level of the Lippe River is about 16 m below the regular 
water level in the canal. The DEK embankments are made of 
silty sands. The building ground consists of sandy marl.During 
construction works continuous ship traffic is maintained. This 
is why a new steel trough was installed directly adjacent to the 
existing trough made of concrete. It was not until the new 
trough was put into operation that the old canal bridge was 
supposed to be sealed off and demolished. The old aqueduct is 
supposed to be replaced by another new trough at the same 
location. At the time of the accident, the construction works 
on the new trough at the north side had almost as much 
progressed as the works on the south side in August 2005, as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
 
The northern abutments of the old and the new canal bridge 
were constructed on a spread footing at 37.00 m above sea 
level (asl) on sandy marl. On the south side it is the same 
construction, but the sandy marl is found two meters deeper in 
elevation. 
 
 
 
 
The old and new wing walls are founded on piles which reach 
into the sandy marl layer. The lower edge of the old 
northeastern wing wall is located at a much greater height 
(43.50 m asl) than the footing of the abutments. 
 
3 DISASTER 
 
On the day of the accident large steel parts were delivered by 
ship and unloaded by a truck mounted telescope crane. Shortly 
before noon, a worker observed leakage between the northern 
abutments of the old and the new canal bridge. Members of 
the construction supervision were immediately informed. They 
found a water whirl in the canal in front of the wing wall of 
the old northern abutment (Fig. 3). The leakage increased 
substantially within a short time period. The water from the 
canal flew first into a small construction pit (Fig. 4), passing 
under a wing wall footed on piles (Fig. 5). This construction 
pit was supposed to be protected by a surcharge drain. Then 
the water flew through the two abutments into the Lippe River 
(Fig. 6). 
 
Disaster alarm was triggered and the safety gates Datteln and 
Schlieker were closed after all the ships had left the canal 
stretch (cf. Fig. 1). A downspout was moreover opened to 
empty the canal stretch. Several attempts to close the leak with 
soil material on the canal side failed (Fig. 7). Due to the high 
flow velocities, the embankment next to the wing wall eroded 
totally (Fig. 8). An 8 km long canal stretch was emptied 
completely. The water from the canal flew around the old and 
the new wing walls into the Lippe River. 
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Fig. 3: Water whirl in front of the wing wall of the northern abutment 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: View of the construction pit between the two abutments 
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Fig. 5: Cross section of the footing at level 45 m asl; water flowing towards the surcharge drain 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Violent water flow through the two abutments into the Lippe River 
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Fig. 7: Attempt to close the leak by dumping soil material into the canal  
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Aerial photograph of the failed embankment next to the concerned wing wall 
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4 HYDRAULIC HEAVE 
 
The European Standard EN 1997-1 (2004) distinguishes 
between four types of ground failure, including failure due to 
pore-water pressure or pore-water seepage: 
 
– uplift, 
– heave, 
– internal erosion, and 
– piping. 
 
When pore-water pressure under a structure or a low 
permeability ground layerbecomes larger than the mean 
overburden pressure failure by uplift occurs. Failure by heave 
occurs when upwards seepage forces act against the weight of 
the soil, reduce the vertical effective stress to zero. Soil 
particles are then lifted away by the vertical water flow and 
failure occurs (boiling). Transport of soil particles within a 
soil stratum is defined as internal erosion. Piping is restricted 
to the occurrence of a pipe-shaped discharge tunnel, whereas 
according to Terzaghi (1947) piping includes heave as well. 
The factor of safety Gs is determined by the ratio of the 
submerged weight W’ of the body of soil and the total excess 
hydrostatic pressure Ue at the bottom of a column (Fig. 10b). 
 
e
s U
W
G
    (1) 
 
Ue is equivalent to the seepage force mentioned in EN 1997-1. 
The European Standard allows including pore water pressure 
and total stress into the calculation, while the German national 
annex does not. As the European Standard uses a partial factor 
of safety, the equations differ from Terzaghi’s formula. 
However, this does not matter in the following discussion. 
 
Fig. 9: Graphical determination of safety (from: Terzaghi K.(1947), Fig. 79) 
 
Terzaghi further mentions in regard to failure by heave: “With 
sufficient accuracy we can assume that the body of sand which 
is lifted by the water has the shape of a prism with a width D/2 
and a horizontal base at some depth D3 below the surface. […] 
For the simple row of sheet piles represented in Figure 79b an 
investigation has shown that the critical section passes almost 
exactly through the lower edge of the sheet piles, or D3 = D.” 
In Germany, this is defined as the failure body after Terzaghi. 
Instead of using a potential net, another way of simplification 
is used in Germany for such a case; the potential at this wall 
base is calculated based on the formula by Brinch Hansen 
(1953), which is also mentioned in EAU (2004). According to 
this approach, instead of a prism with a width D/2, only a flow 
channel needs to be examined. The result for the simple row 
of sheet piles represented in Figure 9b would be on the safe 
side. 
 
If the lining of the DEK canal is intact, only the groundwater 
interact with the Lippe River below the embankments and no 
failure due to water can occur. However, if the canal lining is 
leaking, a substantial amount of canal water may flow into the 
ground, leading to rising groundwater levels. At German 
waterways, the failure of a lining is always to be considered at 
least as an accidental design situation according to the Code of 
Practice “Stability of Embankments at German Inland 
Waterways (MSD)” (BAW, 2011). In the following, reasons 
for a failed clay lining  will not be examined. Instead, the 
paper focuses on the verification of stability, and especially on 
the verification against hydraulic heave in this particular case. 
Furthermore, assumptions (e.g. on the ground) are simplified 
for better understanding. 
 
Fig. 10 depicts a cross section of the northeast wing wall 
between the two abutments. As already mentioned, the wing 
wall is founded on piles, which reach into the marl layer. If the 
clay lining fails, canal water can flow through the non-
cohesive soil around the wing wall towards the pit bottom 
(Fig. 5 and 10). According to BAW (2011), potential 
degradation below the pile head slab is not to be considered in 
case of structures founded on piles. This means that a 
hydraulically effective gap is to be expected between the pile 
head slab and the subsoil. Using a simplified approach, as 
potential degradation is to be neglected; the thickness of the 
construction can be reduced correspondingly. The wing wall, 
which can be up to 8 m wide, may be regarded as a sheet-pile 
wall (cf. structural scheme Fig. 10). 
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Fig. 10: Cross section of the northeast wing wall and structural scheme 
 
The columns examined are described in Figure 11. The water 
level on the landward side corresponds to the red line. 
Assuming that the ground is homogeneous and no surcharge 
drain is installed, the safety against hydraulic heave would be 
much smaller than unity in regard to the permitted excavation 
bottom (Fig. 11a). For sufficient safety, the surface should be 
much higher (Fig. 11b). However, this was not possible due to 
the construction progress. Instead, a deeper pit was dug and a 
surcharge drain applied (Fig. 11c). The surface had to be on 
the level shown in Figure 11a. The safety was verified with 
the failure body according to Terzaghi, including the weight 
on the drain (Fig. 11c). But with a surcharge drain at the 
bottom of the sheet pile, the calculated safety would be infinite 
since the excess hydrostatic pressure Ue is zero (Fig. 11d). 
 
A more realistic result is obtained if, as described in Terzaghi 
(1947), the balance is considered not only at the wall base but 
also at other depths D3  D (Fig. 9c). Terzaghi writes: “The 
investigation can be repeated for different horizontal sections 
through the sand, which are located at different depths D3 
below the bottom of the pit. The critical head is determined by 
the condition hp = minimum, and the horizontal section to 
which this minimum refers is the critical section. It represents 
the lower boundary of the mass of sand subject to lifting in the 
initial state of the piping phenomenon.” However, this was not 
considered when planning the excavation pit at the canal 
bridge Lippe and hence a false safety was calculated. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Different columns reaching down to the lower edge of 
the sheet pile 
 
Numerical analyses conducted by BAW show that even if 
Terzaghi’s statements are considered, the necessary thickness 
of the surcharge drain df becomes less if the leftover soil at the 
sheet pile bottom is removed. In the diagram (cf. Fig.12), h 
equates h1 and t equates D according to Terzaghi. If t/h 
equates zero, the upper line in the diagram drops after 
reaching a peak. As this is surprising, BAW ordered 
experimental tests to be executed at the Bundeswehr 
University Munich to verify the theoretical results (Schober et. 
al. 2011). As shown by the lower line in the diagram, the same 
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effect occurred in the test. The two lines are not identical since 
the calculation was performed only for the maximum 
thickness of the surcharge drain df without uniform 
distribution. Thus Terzaghi’s statements were confirmed. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12: Results of experimental series as a function of dF/h 
and t/h in: Schober et. al. (2011), Fig. 12 
 
5 PIPING 
 
It must be considered that the risk of failure by piping 
increases enormously if the excavation ends near the bottom 
of the sheet pile. Therefore the surcharge drain must built with 
care. This was also described by Terzaghi & Peck (1948): 
“The emergence of water from the ground at the boundary 
between a coarse and a fine soil may cause scour of the finer 
material, provided the velocity of the discharging water is 
great enough. Scour usually begins with the formation of 
small springs at different points along the boundary, from 
which channels are eroded in a backward direction toward the 
area where the water enters the soil. Hence, the process is 
known as backward erosion. It is one of the most dangerous 
menaces to dams, and it has been responsible for some of the 
most catastrophic dam failures […]”. 
This means that even before excessively high flow forces can 
cause hydraulic heave, as described above, the construction is 
at risk to fail when water flows in, even if only low flow 
forces are present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The disaster at the Lippe canal bridge shows that failure of a 
bottom lining is no theoretical load case at all, especially if 
construction works are performed. But the failure of the lining 
only triggered the disaster. It cannot be regarded as its cause 
because at German waterways, failure of the lining needs to be 
considered for all construction phases. 
Because a legally binding agreement on the distribution of the 
financial losses between owner and contractor has not been 
reached yet, no further information concerning the relevant 
cause of the disaster at Lippe canal bridge can be given at this 
point. 
However, erosion and hydraulic heave can be avoided by 
considering Terzaghi’s recommendations. Although he 
published his works in the first half of the last century, they 
should not fall into oblivion. 
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